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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a legal malpractice action by St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center 
against Defendants Thomas Luciani and his law firm Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith, P.S. 
(collectively "Luciani" or "Defendants"). Luciani represented Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center ("Magic Valley"), Plaintiff's predecessor, in a wrongful termination and False Claims Act 
action alleging fraudulent Medicare billing brought against it in 2003 (the "Suter litigation"). In 
March 2006, after Luciani failed timely to retain a defense expert and otherwise mishandled the 
litigation, exposing Magic Valley to the risk of an $18 million adverse judgment, Magic Valley 
replaced Luciani as counsel. The Suter litigation continued for approximately four more years 
and resulted in a settlement with the Suter plaintiffs for $4.25 million and in legal and expert 
defense expenses of approximately $12 million. Order Certifying Question to Idaho Supreme 
Court (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2011) ("Order") at 1-2.1 
In July 2006, Magic Valley sold substantially all of its assets and liabilities to St. Luke's 
Magic VaUey Regional Medical Center ("St. Luke's" or "St. Luke's Magic Valley"), the plaintiff 
in this action. Among the assets transferred by Magic Valley to St. Luke's were any "claims 
against third parties by the Hospital ... , ... whether known or unknown, contingent or 
otherwise." Order at 3. After the closing of the transaction, which was "effectively an asset and 
liability transfer from Magic Valley to St. Luke's," "Magic Valley ceased to exist and the 
operation and management of the medical center was taken over by St. Luke's. The Magic 
I In granting the district court's certification request, this Court ordered that the district 
court's certification order would constitu te the initial record on appeal, and directed the district 
court to provide copies of the complaint, motion for summary judgment, and related affidavits 
and briefing to the Court. The citations in this brief are to those pleadings, with the filing dates 
in parentheses. 
I 
Valley management team became the St. Luke's management team with some minor 
modifications." Id. Following the closing, the Hospital continued to function in the same 
facilities, with the same management and employees, the same board of directors, and the same 
Medicare accreditation and state license. Thus, from the standpoint of the hospital's ongoing 
operations, the transaction amounted to little more than changing the name on the door by adding 
the two words "St. Luke's." 
It is undisputed that St. Luke's assumed Magic Valley's liability in the Suter litigation 
and continued to defend the False Claims Act claim. Order at 3. Thus, it was St. Luke's, not its 
predecessor Magic Valley, that incurred the legal and expert fees necessary to remedy Luciani's 
malpractice; and it was St. Luke's, not Magic Valley, that ultimately paid $4.25 million to the 
Suter plaintiffs to settle that litigation. In January 2008, St. Luke's brought this action against 
Defendants for legal malpractice seeking to recover those fees and costs as damages. After 
Defendants moved for summary judgment, the district court certified to this Court under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 12.3 the question whether Idaho law allows claims for legal malpractice to be 
assigned. 
On the undisputed facts, this Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative 
and hold that Magic Valley's assignment of its legal malpractice claim to St. Luke's Magic 
Valley was effective under Idaho law. The majority of courts that have considered the specific 
issue presented here hold that a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its 
successor, just as Magic Valley did here. See Section A, infra. That result is consistent with 
simple fairness, as an attorney should not be able to escape liability for the consequences of his 
own malpractice due to the fortuity of a change in ownership of his client. See Section A(3), 
infra. It is also consistent with Idaho law, which expressly authorizes the assignment of things in 
action, including claims against attorneys and law firms, and recognizes that legal malpractice 
2 
claims involve purely pecuniary interests that survive a claimant's death (and are therefore 
assignable). See Section B, infra. While some states have articulated a general rule of non-
assignability, the vast majority of those cases bar assignment of legal malpractice claims to 
strangers to the attorney-client relationship, not to successors in interest. See Section C(2), infra. 
Moreover, none of the public policy considerations that are said to support a blanket rule of non-
assignability applies here. See Section C(3), infra. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
St. Luke's filed its Complaint for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional breach of fiduciary 
duty, and professional malpractice against Defendants in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho. CompI. (Jan. 17,2008). St. Luke's seeks to recover by its lawsuit $4.25 
million it paid in settlement in the Suter litigation; approximately $12 million in attorneys' fees it 
paid to successor counsel, less approximately $9.1 million recovered from the hospital's insurers, 
Truck and Travelers, and from the Suter plaintiffs through an award of sanctions; approximately 
$2.7 million in fees paid to its current counsel incurred in pursuit of insurance proceeds from 
Truck and Travelers; interest on those sums; and attorneys' fees and costs incurred prosecuting 
the malpractice litigation. PI.' s Am. Initial Disclosures [Dec. of Christopher W. Tompkins in 
Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (Jan. 14,2011) ("Tompkins Dec."), Ex. 8]; Sep. 13,2010 
Thomas 1. South Report of Damages at 2, [Dec. of Gregory D. Call in Supp. of PI.' s Opp. to 
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (Feb. 7, 2011) ("Call Dec."), Ex. 11]. St. Luke's is also seeking 
punitive damages from Defendants, having filed a motion for leave to amend its Complaint to 
add a prayer for relief for punitive damages, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. That motion was 
heard on May 20, 2011 in the Idaho federal district court, but the federal court has not yet ruled 
on the motion. 
3 
On March 10,2008, Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses, which 
included an admission that Defendants had an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's. 
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses (Mar. 10,2008), <]1<]152,62 [Call Dec., Ex. 31]. 
On March 31, 2008, the action was stayed until January 4, 2010, while related litigation between 
Plaintiff and Truck was resolved. In December 2010, Defendants for the first time took the 
position that they did not have an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's and that their 
admission in their Answer was in error, and subsequently filed a motion to amend their Answer. 
The court granted Defendants' motion on May 19,2011, and Defendants filed an Amended 
Answer on May 24,2011, denying that they had an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's. 
On January 14,2011, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, including among 
the grounds for their motion the argument that St. Luke's could not maintain a legal malpractice 
claim against Defendants because no attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiff and 
Defendants. On February 7, 2011, St. Luke's filed its opposition brief, raising, among other 
arguments, Defendants' prior admission of an attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's in their 
Answer; that as a successor entity St. Luke's was entitled to stand in Magic Valley's shoes for 
the purposes of the attorney-client relationship; and that even if the attorney-client relationship 
did not pass automatically to St. Luke's, the right to sue Defendants for malpractice was validly 
assigned to St. Luke's. On February 25,2011, Defendants filed their reply brief. 
On October 28,2011, the United States District Court (Hon. Edward J. Lodge) issued an 
Order seeking to certify to this Court the following question of law: "Does Idaho law allow legal 
malpractice claims to be assigned?" As the court explained in its order, the facts related to this 
issue are "not disputed by the parties." Order at 1. In a transaction that closed on July 1, 2006, 
"the assets and liabilities associated with the operation of Magic Valley" were transferred to S1. 
Luke's Magic Valley. Id. at 2-3. The transaction was governed by a Sale and Lease Agreement 
4 
under which Twin Falls County, the owner of Magic Valley, and Magic Valley trans felTed to S1. 
Luke's any "claims against third parties by the Hospital ... , whether or not reflected on the 
Hospital's Balance Sheet and whether known or unknown, contingent or otherwise." [d. at 3. 
While the Sales and Lease Agreement did not contain any specific assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim against Luciani, it was undisputed that S1. Luke's was aware of the Suter 
litigation and the potential financial liability associated with the litigation as well as the decision 
to hire successor counsel and terminate Luciani's representation. !d. Thus, "[t]he question in 
this case is whether S1. Luke's (as Luciani's former client's successor) can step into the shoes of 
Magic Valley for Magic Valley's legal malpractice claim against Luciani in light of the broad 
assignment language used in the Sale and Lease Agreement or are legal malpractice actions not 
assignable in Idaho as a matter of law." [d. at 4. 
On November 17, 2011, this Court accepted the certification of that question of law. 
III. STATEMENT OJ? FACTS 
A. St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center Is the Successor to Magic 
Valley Regional Medical Center. 
1. Following A July 2006 Transaction, Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center Joined the St. Luke's Health System and Changed Its Name, 
Continuing the Same Operations With the Same Personnel in the 
Same Location. 
Magic Valley Regional Medical Center was a county-owned hospital operating in Twin 
Falls County, Idaho. In 2006, Magic Valley engaged in a transaction whereby Magic Valley 
became part of the newly created S1. Luke's Health System and the hospital became known as 
"S1. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center" (the "S1. Luke's Transaction"). Sale and 
Lease Agreement, [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. 
5 
Upon the close of the St. Luke's Transaction on July 1,2006, the hospital continued to 
operate as it had before under a different name. St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center "employ(ed] the same personnel, occupie[d] the same land, conduct[ed] the same 
business, haC d] the same address, and occupier d] the same facilities as did Magic Valley." 
Groesbeck Aff. gr 5 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. Its board of directors included the members from 
the board of directors of Magic Valley. ld., 7f 5. St. Luke's Magic Valley retained the same 
Medicare provider number as its predecessor and was not required to reapply for accreditation. 
ld., grlJ[ 6-7. St. Luke's Magic Valley was "not required to be recertified by the Bureau of Facility 
Standards for the State of Idaho (the Idaho hospital licensing authority) as a result of' the St. 
Luke's Transaction. ld. gr 8. St. Luke's Magic Valley "agreed to use Magic Valley Regional 
Medical Center staff, space and equipment to deliver the same health services that were provided 
by Magic Valley Regional Medical Center," (id. gr 3), and it has continually operated in Twin 
Falls County, providing hospital services, just as its predecessor had. 2 
2. St. Luke's Magic Valley Became Magic Valley's Successor, Assuming 
Its Predecessor's Contracts, Liabilities, Obligations, Property, and 
Interests, Including All Claims Against Third Parties. 
The terms of the St. Luke's Transaction were memorialized in the Sale and Lease 
Agreement. Sale and Lease Agreement [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. As the Sale and Lease 
Agreement states, St. Luke's assumed all of Magic Valley's "contracts, agreements, and leases," 
to the extent they were assignable. ld., Article II, § 2.2(b). Magic Valley also sold or assigned 
all its hospital records, inventory, and grants to St. Luke's. ld. §§ 2.2(d)-(e), (g). St. Luke's 
2 In 2011, St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center moved to a new facility in 
Twin Falls. 
6 
Magic Valley also received all cash, investments, and accounts receivable owned by or owed to 
Magic Valley. Id. § 2.2(f). 
St. Luke's Magic Valley also assumed "all debts, liabilities and obligations" of Magic 
Valley, specifically including "any fines, penalties and punitive, consequential and other special 
damages." Id., Article III. While certain liabilities that were "covered and paid by insurance" 
were excluded from the transfer, St. Luke's Magic Valley became liable for any defense costs 
and any judgment in the underlying Suter actions to the extent those costs were not already paid 
for by insurance. !d.; Groesbeck Aff., <Jr 3 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. 
Articles II and III of the Sale and Lease Agreement set forth the provisions that validly 
assigned the malpractice claim against Defendants to St. Luke's Magic Valley. [Tompkins Dec., 
Ex. 7]. Section 2.2(b) assigned all of Magic Valley's "contracts, agreements, and leases," and all 
of their "benefits and burdens." !d. Section 2.5, entitled "Other Property," explained that with a 
few specific exceptions "it is the intent of the Parties that all property and interests of the 
hospital ... be leased, sold, assigned, licensed or transferred" to St. Luke's Magic Valley, 
including "any claims against third parties by the Hospital and settlements received thereto, 
whether or not reflected on the Hospital's Balance Sheet and whether known or unknown, 
contingent or otherwise." Id. (emphasis added). 
Several other operative documents were signed at the closing of the St. Luke's 
Transaction to effectuate various transfers referenced in the Sale and Lease Agreement. For 
example, the Bill of Sale re-stated that "all of the benefits and burdens" of the "contracts, 
agreements, and leases" set forth in Article II, Section 2.2 were being assigned to St. Luke's 
Magic Valley. Bill of Sale § 2(a)(ii) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 74]; Sale and Lease Agreement, 
Article II, § 2.2(b) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. Execution of these additional documents in no way 
negated the broad language transferring "any claims against third parties." See Sale and Lease 
7 
Agreement, Articles II and III [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]. 
B. In the Underlying Suter Litigation, Defendants Represented Magic Valley, 
but Failed to Take the Steps Necessary to Adequately Defend the Litigation. 
1. Truck "Panel" Attorney Tom Luciani Agreed To Defend The Entire 
Underlying Suter Litigation Despite His Lack Of Relevant Experience. 
In August of 2001, Cheri Suter and Mindy Harmer, two former employees of Magic 
Valley's Transitional Care Unit ("TCU"), filed suit in Idaho state court, alleging various 
employment causes of action. In January 2003, in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho, Suter and Harmer filed under seal a qui tam action in the name of the United 
States government, alleging Magic Valley violated the False Claims Act by sUbmitting false 
claims for reimbursement to Medicare for rehabilitation services provided in the TCU. The 
False Claims Act complaint was unsealed in July of 2003 after the government declined to 
intervene. In March of 2003, Suter and Harmer filed an employment action in Idaho federal 
court, essentially duplicating the claims in the state employment action and adding a False 
Claims Act retaliation claim. The Idaho state employment action was stayed, and the federal 
employment action was subsequently consolidated with the qui tam action. Collectively, these 
actions are referred to as the "Suter Litigation." See Suter Litigation Compls. [Tompkins Dec., 
Exs. 9, 12, and 13]. 
Magic Valley's insurer Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") initially defended the Suter 
litigation on behalf of Magic Valley through the firm of Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, but 
appointed Tom Luciani of the Washington firm of Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith 
("Defendants") in July of 2003, the same month the False Claims Act complaint was unsealed. 
See Luciani Dep. 24: 17-25: 16 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Stamper, Rubens, Stocker & Smith was a 
member of a "panel" of attorneys that Truck regularly used to defend its insureds. See Anderson 
Dep., 100:24-101:4 [Call Dec., Ex. 12]. Luciani had experience in handling medical malpractice 
8 
cases, but no experience in defending claims alleging false Medicare billing. Luciani Dep. 14:6-
10; 15:25-16: 19 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Luciani agreed to defend the entire litigation and understood 
he was responsible for defending the False Claims Act claims. Id. 28:6-29: 14. 
2. Luciani Failed Adequately To Defend the Suter Litigation, 
Conducting No Substantive Legal Research On the False Claims Act 
Claims and Failing to Retain an Expert Witness. 
In defending Magic Valley, Luciani failed to conduct any meaningful research on the 
False Claims Act claims, relying on CLE materials and a conversation with a CLE presenter. 
Luciani Dep. 60:25-62: 11 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. In particular, Luciani did not research whether his 
defense strategy that Magic Valley could blame co-defendant NRP for any false billings was a 
valid one. !d. 59:24-60:24; 131:13-134:17. 
Luciani failed to communicate with Magic Valley, sending at least five status updates to 
Truck that were not also copied to Magic Valley, his client. See Status Updates Oct. 4, 2004-
Feb. 8, 2006 [Call Dec. <J[ 16, Exs. 15-19]. Luciani admitted to Truck in one of these letters that 
the Suter litigation "is an incredibly complex case because of the nature of the allegations, the 
numerous witnesses and the mind-boggling regulations that form the basis for the Medicare 
suhmissions in question." See Oct. 4, 2004 Luciani Letter to Dexter, at 4 [Call Dec., Ex. 15]. 
Luciani also engaged in unauthorized coverage discussions with Truck. See Feb. 8,2006 
Luciani letter to Johnson [Call Dec., Ex. 16]. 
On December 22, 2005, the Suter plaintiffs served on Luciani a report prepared by their 
expert, R. Lawrence Nicholson. Report of Nicholson [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 26]. The report was 
based on an audit of patient files and calculated Magic V ailey's liability for damages under the 
False Claims Act at more than $18 million. Id. p. 25. Despite the magnitude of the alleged 
damages, Luciani did not inform Magic Valley about the report until twelve days after the report 
was submitted. Luciani's Billing Records [Tomkins Dec., Ex. 18]. Magic Valley later learned 
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that its deadline for disclosing expert witnesses and expert reports, including rebuttal of the 
Nicholson Report, was less than a month away. Jan. 17,2006 A. Taylor Email to Rosenbloom 
[Tompkins Dec., Ex. 31]. Although Luciani was aware of the fast-approaching deadline for 
Magic Valley to submit its own expert reports, Luciani had not retained any expert on False 
Claims Act damages or any expert who could rebut Nicholson's report. Luciani Dep. 45:21-46:8 
[Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Moreover, Luciani had not even had conversations with any experts as of 
January 2006 about whether Magic Valley's Medicare billing was in compliance. Id.50:8-12. 
3. Luciani's Malpractice Caused a Crisis for the Hospital, Forcing the 
Hospital to Retain Substitute Counsel. 
Lacking a defense, Magic Valley was in crisis. Magic Valley was at risk of an adverse 
summary judgment in the amount of $18 million, a judgment so substantial that it could have 
caused Magic Valley to default on its bonds, which would have been, in the words of its CFO, a 
"catastrophic event financially for the hospital." Groesbeck Dep. 139:24-140:10 (Truck 
litigation) [Call Dec., Ex. 21]; Barry Dep. 158:6-14 [Call Dec., Ex. 22]. Luciani himself told 
Magic Valley that the Nicholson report presented serious "problems" for Magic VaHey, 
including: 
Rebutting the assertion that we knowingly or recklessly submitted 
false claims based on the conduct of contract vendors and their 
employees, in the face of allegations that we had no mechanism in 
place to supervise such conduct; and 
Effectively mediating in an environment where the responsible co-
defendant is self-insured and is not believed to have the monetary 
assets required to contribute in an amount that would permit 
settlement. Consequently, mediation is doomed to fail, or we will 
be expected to pay an amount that grossly exceeds our individual 
responsibility. 
Jan. 6,2006 Luciani Letter to K. Taylor at 2-3 (emphasis added) [Call Dec., Ex. 10]. 
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While there may have been weaknesses in the Nicholson Report, "there were enough 
strands of a legitimate audit" that the report would not be excluded from evidence. Hayman 
Dep. 33:19-35:4; 107:22-109:17 [Call Dec., Ex. 23]. Therefore, Magic Valley needed an expert 
who could rebut the Nicholson Report or it would be left without a defense. Hayman Dep. 
107:22-108:17 [Call Dec., Ex. 23]; Barry Dep. 158:6-159:15 [Call Dec., Ex. 22]. 
Its future at stake, Magic Valley sought advice from other counsel and was advised that 
an audit was absolutely necessary. Magic Valley needed to retain a law firm with sufficient 
resources and expertise to respond to the Nicholson Report in record time. It contacted the firm 
of McDermott, Will & Emery ("McDermott"), but McDermott made clear that its "ability to 
prepare and present a defense" depended on the court's willingness to extend the schedule, 
stating that "[i]n light of the factual work that needs to be done by any expert, and the lack of 
currently retained experts, we do not believe there is any way we would be able to appear as 
counsel ... and abide by the existing case schedule." Jan. 30,2006 Engagement Letter 
[Tompkins Dec., Ex. 33]. 
Eventually, extensions were obtained and Magic Valley's expert report submitted, but 
given the volume of records to be audited, the report prepared by Coding Compliance Solutions 
("CCS"), the expert hired by McDermott, was not completed until over a month and one-half 
after the initial rebuttal expert report deadline. Mar. 24,2006 Edford Report [Tompkins Dec., 
Ex. 45]. The report revealed no statistically significant billing errors. Id. McDermott 
subsequently deposed the Suter plaintiffs' expert witness Nicholson and learned that he had lied 
on his resume, resulting in his withdrawal as an expert witness. Hayman Dep. 28:22-31:20 [Call 
Dec., Ex. 23] 
While McDermott successfully managed the initial crisis, damage still remained from 
Luciani's negligence, some of which could not be corrected. See, e.g., Pl.'s 30(b)(6) Dep. 183:2-
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187:16 [Call Dec., Ex. 14]. Luciani never filed a motion to dismiss. Id. at 183:2-21. He failed 
adequately to prepare Magic Valley's witnesses for their depositions. Id. at 186:2-24. He failed 
to propound written discovery relating to the False Claims Act allegations. Id. at 123:8-124:6. 
He relied on co-defendant NRP to notice and lead offensive depositions. Luciani Dep. 208:23-
209:20 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. He "participated in" the depositions of the plaintiffs but focused on 
plaintiffs' wrongful termination claims. /d. He failed to assert a statute of limitations defense to 
the Suter plaintiffs' False Claims Act retaliation claim and failed to explore whether the original 
source rule barred Cheri Suter's claims. Pl.'s 30(b)(6) Dep. 182:21-190:2 [Call Dec., Ex. 14]. 
By the time McDermott took over, fact discovery was nearly complete and Magic Valley was 
stuck with the evidentiary record Luciani had allowed to be created. Jun. 6,2005 Order Granting 
Second Stip. Mot. for Extension of Time [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 27]; Pl.'s 30(b)(6) Dep. 183:2-21 
[Call Dec., Ex. 14]. 
Burdened by the lingering effects of Luciani's malpractice, in April 2010, St. Luke's 
Magic Valley and the Suter plaintiffs settled their litigation for $4.25 million. The Settlement 
Agreement between them contained no admission of liability by St. Luke's Magic Valley. 
Settlement Agreement at 1 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 49]. 
4. Defendants' Malpractice Caused Magic Valley And St. Luke's to 
Incur Damages in the Form of Uninsured Attorneys' Fees And Other 
Costs. 
During Luciani's time as counsel for Magic Valley, Truck paid his fees for the defense of 
the entire Suter litigation, including the False Claims Act claims. Luciani Dep. 79: 17-
80:3;104:23-105:2 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. Once Luciani's negligence led to his replacement, Truck 
stopped paying the defense costs for the False Claims Act portion of the Suter litigation, despite 
an admitted duty to defend under the applicable insurance policy. See Truck's Mot. for Summ. J. 
at 12-13 (Truck Litigation) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 6]. As a result, Magic Valley-and then St. 
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Luke's Magic Valley-was forced to pay defense costs for the False Claims Act litigation out of 
pocket. Groesbeck Aff. <JI:1O [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]; CompI. <JI:~[ 48-52 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 1]. 
As a result of Luciani's negligence, Magic Valley and St. Luke's Magic Valley also had to 
negotiate, and then litigate, with Truck over the payment of these Suter litigation defense costs. 
Groesbeck Aff. <JI:1O [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]; Truck Litigation CompI. [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 62]; 
Truck Litigation Answer and Counterclaims [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 63]. But for Luciani's 
negligence, Magic Valley would not have needed to replace him and Truck would have 
continued to pay Luciani's fees in defense of the entire Suter litigation as the insurer previously 
had done. See Luciani Dep. 79: 17-80:3 [Call Dec., Ex. 8]. 
C. After The St. Luke's Transaction, St. Luke's Stepped Into Magic Valley's 
Shoes In The Suter Litigation and All Related Disputes. 
1. St. Luke's Continued the Defense of the Suter Litigation, Paying 
Defense Costs and the Settlement. 
Upon the close of the St. Luke's Transaction on July 1,2006, Magic Valley ceased to 
exist. May 14, 2008 Memo. Decision and Order (Truck Litigation) at 5 [Call Dec., Ex. 23]. St. 
Luke's became responsible for the Suter litigation, continuing to defend the action and pay 
defense costs not paid for by insurance. Am. Initial Disclosures § C(a) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 8]. 
This was consistent with the terms of the Sale and Lease Agreement, whereby St. Luke's Magic 
Valley became liable for any defense costs and any judgment in the underlying actions to the 
extent those costs were not already paid for by insurance. Sale and Lease Agreement, Article III 
(Tompkins Dec., Ex. 7]; Groesbeck Aff., 1[ 3 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. It was St. Luke's Magic 
Valley, not its predecessor Magic Valley, that paid the Suter Litigation settlement of $4.25 
million. See Am. Initial Disclosures § C(c) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 8]. 
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2. S1. Luke's Also Took Up the Dispute with Truck Regarding the 
Payment of Litigation Defense Costs. 
As noted above, Truck and Magic Valley engaged in discussions about payment of the 
False Claims Act claims defense costs after Luciani's negligence led to his replacement with 
McDermott. See Groesbeck Aff. 1 10 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]. Truck contended that the 
defense costs incurred for McDermott's services were voluntary payments by Magic Valley and 
it refused payment on that basis, which Magic Valley disputed. Id. These discussions continued 
throughout 2006, and St. Luke's Magic Valley continued to engage in those discussions after the 
St. Luke's Transaction closed. Id. 
Several months later, for the first time Truck took the position that St. Luke's Magic 
Valley was not entitled to benefits under the policy because Magic Valley was the entity to 
which the insurance policy had been issued. See id. 1 11; Truck Litigation First Am. CompI., 
filed Jan. 17,2007 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho for the County of 
Ada, 1118-25 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 62]. However, Truck admitted that it had a duty to defend 
the Suter litigation under the applicable insurance policy, and it continued to pay for a portion of 
the defense costs for the non-False Claims Act claims, after Luciani's replacement, both before 
and after the St. Luke's Transaction. See Truck's Mot. for Summ. 1. at 12-13 (Truck Litigation) 
[Tompkins Dec., Ex. 6]; Groesbeck Aff. 1~[ 9, 11 [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 72]; Pl.'s Am. Initial 
Disclosures 1 C(a)(ii) [Tompkins Dec., Ex. 8]. 
Ultimately, Truck's argument that St. Luke's Magic Valley was not entitled to benefits 
under the insurance policy failed. The Ada County trial court ruled in the Truck Litigation that 
St. Luke's Magic Valley was entitled to assert claims for breach of duty to defend and bad faith 
against Magic Valley's insurer based on the valid assignment from Magic Valley, effected by the 
broad terms of the Sale and Lease Agreement, even though assignment was prohibited by the 
terms of the insurance policy. May 14,2008 Memo. Decision and Order [Call Dec., Ex. 32]. 
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3. In the Malpractice Litigation, Defendants Initially Admitted They 
Had An Attorney-Client Relationship with St. Luke's Magic Valley. 
Consistent with the position taken by the Suter plaintiffs and Truck, Defendants here 
initially took the position that the St. Luke's Transaction changed only the name of the entity 
involved in the dispute. Defendants admitted in their Answer filed in 2008 that they had an 
attorney-client relationship with St. Luke's Magic Valley, which meant that Defendants agreed 
that St. Luke's Magic Valley was the proper entity to bring the malpractice claim against 
Defendants. Defs.' Answer and Affirmative Defenses (March 10, 2008), n 52, 62 [Call Dec., 
Ex.31]. It was not until two and one-half years later, in December 2010, that Defendants sought 
leave to amend their Answer to withdraw their admission of an attorney-client relationship. 
They filed their amended answer in May 2011. 
IV. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The question certified to this Court by the u.s. District Court for the District of Idaho is 
"Does Idaho law allow legal malpractice claims to be assigned?" The issue is presented on 
undisputed facts in the context of "an asset and liability transfer from Magic Valley to St. 
Luke's" that included an assignment of "all claims against third parties by the Hospital ... , 
whether known or unknown, contingent or otherwise." Order Certifying Question to Idaho 
Supreme Court (D. Idaho Oct. 27,2011) at 2-3. Thus, as the district court phrased it, "The 
question in this case is whether St. Luke's (as Luciani's former client's successor) can step into 
the shoes of Magic Valley for Magic Valley'S legal malpractice claim against Luciani in light of 
the broad assignment language used in the Sale and Lease Agreement or are legal malpractice 
actions not assignable in Idaho as a matter of law." Id. at 4. This Court should answer the 
certified question in that context, relying upon the facts stated by the certifying court and 
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contained in the undisputed record. See Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 792 
P.2d 926, 927-28 (1990) (relying upon factual summary provided by certifying court); Toner v. 
Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297,302 & n.4 (1987) (answering certified 
questions in the context of the claims and contentions in the case). 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue certified to this Court by the District Court is a question of law, over which this 
Court exercises free review. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884,886 (2004). 
VI. ARGUMENT 
MAGIC VALLEY'S ASSIGNMENT OF ITS LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS TO 
ST. LUKE'S, ITS SUCCESSOR, WAS EFFECTIVE UNDER IDAHO LAW. 
The substantial majority of courts to have considered the specific issue presented here 
hold that a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim to its successor. That rule is 
consistent with Idaho law, which authorizes the assignment of things in action and recognizes 
that legal malpractice claims involve pecuniary loss. This Court therefore should follow the 
majority approach and hold that Magic Valley's assignment to St. Luke's of its legal malpractice 
claims against Luciani in the July 2006 transaction was effective under Idaho law. 
A. An Entity May Assign Legal Malpractice Claims To Its Successor. 
1. The Majority Of Courts Uphold The Assignment Of Legal Malpractice 
Claims By A Predecessor Entity To Its Successor. 
The majority of courts to have considered the specific issue presented here, including the 
high courts of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, hold that a predecessor entity may assign legal 
malpractice claims to a successor entity. 4 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 26:10 at 1018 
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(2011 ed.) ("The reported decisions have tended to treat a 'successor' entity as able to assert the 
legal rights of the predecessor, including a pre-existing malpractice claim .... "). This Court 
should follow that rule, which is consistent with Idaho law and prevents an attorney from 
escaping liability for legal malpractice by the fortuity of a corporate transaction involving his or 
her former client. 
Thus, in Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057 (R.I. 1999), the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court held as a matter of first impression in that state that "legal 
malpractice claims, transferred along with other assets and obligations to an assignee in a 
commercial transaction, are assignable." Id. at 1061. The plaintiffs in Cerberus Partners were 
financial institutions that had purchased loans given by a group of commercial lenders to an 
entity that later filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiffs contended that defendant law firms and attorneys, 
who had represented the lenders in the loan transactions, failed to perfect the lenders' security 
interests in the debtor's assets, with the result that plaintiffs were unable to collect the full value 
of the loans they had purchased. They brought an action for legal malpractice, and the trial court 
granted summary judgment for the attorneys on the grounds that there was no attorney-client 
relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants and public policy precluded the assignment 
of legal malpractice actions. Id. at 1058-59. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the assignment was effective. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs "did not merely 
purchase the legal malpractice claim, but were instead the assignees of the Lenders' original 
agreements with respect to the loans to [the debtor], and the plaintiffs acquired, along with those 
loans, all of the attendant obligations and rights that went along with those loans, including but 
not limited to the Lenders' legal malpractice action against the defendants." Id. at 1059. The 
court found that factor distinguished the situation before it from the "great m<0ority" of cases in 
other jurisdictions that had considered the issue of the assignability of legal malpractice claims, 
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where "a legal malpractice claim was transferred to a person without any other rights or 
obligations being transferred along with it." Id. 
In Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1996), the court went even farther, 
holding that an assignment of legal malpractice claims in a sales transaction was effective under 
District of Columbia law even though the buyer was not the seller's successor in interest. The 
defendant, which had purchased certain assets and liabilities of the seller and continued the 
operation of the seller's business, brought a counterclaim for legal malpractice against the 
seller's attorney. The court found that because the sales contract appeared to transfer only 
certain specifically enumerated assets and the defendant had entered into a covenant not to 
compete with the selling entity, which suggested that it continued to exist following the 
transaction, the defendant was not its legal successor for purposes of bringing preexisting claims. 
Id. at 356. It nevertheless held that the seller's general assignment to the defendant of "claims 
and demands" included claims for legal malpractice arising directly out of the seller's conduct, 
and that District of Columbia law did not prevent the seller from assigning those claims. Id. at 
357-58; accord, Learning Curve Intern., Inc. v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, 911 N.E.2d 1068, 1080-82 
(Ill. App. 2009) (corporation's assignment of malpractice claim as part of transfer of assets in 
merger did not violate Illinois public policy) (following Cerberus Partners and Richter); 
Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1987) (assignment by client 
patentee of "the entire right, title and interest in and to the patent application" and of "all rights 
and causes of action" against attorney arising out of the mishandling of the patent application 
was effective under Pennsylvania law);3 see also Child, Inc. v. Rodgers, 377 A.2d 374,378 (Del. 
3 In Hedlund, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the assignee of a legal 
malpractice claim had standing to assert the claim despite a lack of privity with the attorney, 
observing that "[p]rivity is not an issue in cases involving an assigned claim because the assignee 
(Continued ... ) 
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Super. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Pioneer Nat 'I Title Ins. Co. v. Child, 
Inc., 401 A.2d 68 (Del. 1979) (foundation that adopted predecessor foundation's name and 
charter succeeded to its interests and therefore had standing to maintain action for damages 
against predecessor's attorney).4 
2. The Assignment Is Valid, Regardless Of The Form Of The Transaction, 
If The Practical Consequences Of The Transaction Resulted In Transfer 
Of Control Of The Business. 
As Richter illustrates, whether a predecessor entity may assign a legal malpractice claim 
to a successor entity does not turn on the technical form of the transaction, such as whether it 
involves a merger or a sale of assets. That is because there are "myriad ways control of a 
corporation or a pOIiion of [a] corporation can change hands." Souverain Software LLC v. Gap, 
Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 760, 763 (B.D. Tex. 2004). Rather, it depends on the "practical 
consequences of the transaction": if the transaction results in a transfer of control of the 
stands in the shoes of the assignor and does not pursue the cause of action in the assignee's own 
right." 539 A.2d at 358 (citation omitted). Thus, this Court's ruling that a direct attorney-client 
relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant in a legal 
malpractice action except in certain narrow circumstances (Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 
134,90 P.3d 884 (2004» does not resolve the issue before the Court here. 
4 Other courts have reached a similar conclusion in a variety of contexts, including 
assignment of claims by a corporation to shareholders or other related parties. See, e.g., 
Learning Curve Intern., Inc., 911 N.E.2d at 1080-82 (corporation validly assigned legal 
malpractice claim to former shareholders, who suffered the loss due to the alleged malpractice); 
Collins v. Fitzwater, 560 P.2d1074 (Or. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, Lancaster v. Royal Ins. 
Co., 302 Or. 62 ( 1986) (corporate director assigned legal malpractice claim against corporate 
attorney to purchasers of securities); Kaplan v. Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P. c., 832 So.2d 
138, 140 (Fla. Dist. App. 2002), decision approved, 902 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2005) (corporation had 
right to assign claim for legal malpractice arising out of preparation of private placement 
memoranda to assignee for benefit of creditors). 
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corporation and therefore of the attorney-client privilege,5 the successor is entitled to pursue the 
predecessor entity's legal malpractice claim. Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., 
585 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
In Parus Holdings, the court denied defendant attorneys' motion to dismiss legal 
malpractice claims brought against them arising out of their work on a patent application for a 
predecessor entity. The court rejected the attorneys' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing 
to bring the claims, emphasized that the patents had been assigned to it and that it took over the 
division of the predecessor's business responsible for development and marketing of the patented 
telephony system, including "taking on employees and managers from the division." Id. at 1003; 
see also, e.g., Goodrich v. Goodrich, 960 A.2d 1275, 1285 (N.H. 2008) (following sale, 
successor corporation continued to own, manage and lease corporate office building and 
possessed predecessor's preexisting rights and liabilities); Tekni-Plex v. Meyner & Landis, 674 
N.E.2d 663,667-69 (N.Y. 1996) (where successor corporation acquired assets of corporate 
client, which ceased to exist, and "the business of [predecessor] remained unchanged, with the 
same products, clients, suppliers and non-managerial personnel," control of attorney-client 
privilege passed to successor corporation); Oswall v. Tekni-Plex, Inc., 691 A.2d 889, 894-95 
(N.J. App. Div. 1997) ("the corporation produces the same products, under the same name in the 
same facilities and inherited all of the liabilities and rights of the former corporation"). 
Here, as discussed in more detail above, the July 2006 transaction involved a transfer of 
5 In general, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege 
follows the passage of control of the corporation. Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n v. 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,349 (1985) (trustee of corporation in bankruptcy has power to waive 
debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege as to pre-filing communications). 
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substantially all of Magic Valley's assets and liabilities to St. Luke's, including a general 
assignment of "all claims against third parties by the Hospital ... , whether known or unknown, 
contingent or otherwise." After the transaction closed, the hospital continued to employ the 
same personnel and to conduct the same business in the same facility, under the direction of the 
same board of directors, utilizing the same Medicare accreditation and state license, as it had 
under the Magic Valley name. Accordingly, just as in Richter and other cases, Magic Valley's 
general assignment to St. Luke's of all claims against third parties including Luciani was an 
effective assignment to a business successor. 
3. An Attorney Should Not Be Able To Escape Liability For Legal 
Malpractice Due To The Fortuity Of A Change In Corporate Ownership. 
Allowing a predecessor entity to assign legal malpractice claims to its successor is 
consistent with the consideration that an attorney should not be able to escape liability for legal 
malpractice by the mere fortuity of a change in corporate ownership. As the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court observed in Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 
1987), 
We will not allow the concept of the attorney-client relationship to 
be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the 
consequences of legal malpractice. Where the attorney has caused 
harm to his or her client, there is no relationship that remains to be 
protected. 
Id. at 359. That consideration applies squarely here, because following the July 2006 
transaction, Magic Valley was dissolved, and its assets and liabilities were transferred to St. 
Luke's. St. Luke's therefore is the only surviving entity that has the ability to assert a claim 
against Luciani arising out of his representation of Magic Valley. Refusing to enforce Magic 
Valley's assignment of its claims would shield defendants' alleged malpractice from legal 
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scrutiny and disserve the interest in compensating a harmed client, yet would not further any of 
the public policies that are said to support the rule against assignability in other contexts. 
B. Assignment Of Legal Malpractice Claims To A Successor Entity Is 
Consistent With Idaho Law. 
The rule that a predecessor entity may validly assign a legal malpractice claim to a 
successor is consistent with Idaho law, for at least two reasons. First, Idaho law expressly 
authorizes assignment of things in action, including claims against attomeys and law firms. 
Second, Idaho law recognizes that legal malpractice claims are claims arising from contract, 
which survive the death of a plaintiff and are therefore assignable, rather than claims for personal 
injury, which do not. 
1. Idaho Law Expressly Authorizes Assignment Of Things In Action. 
Assignment of legal malpractice claims to a successor entity is consistent with Idaho law, 
which expressly authorizes assignment of things in action. Idaho Code Section 55-402 provides: 
A thing in action arising out of the violation of a right of property, 
or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner. Upon the 
death of the owner it passes to his personal representatives, except 
where, in the cases provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, it 
passes to his devisees or successor in interest. 
It is settled in Idaho that a cause of action, or "thing in action," may be assigned. 
Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234,657 P.2d 1102 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (citing I.e. 
§ 55-402); Casady v. Scott, 40 Idaho 137,237 P. 415 (1924). As this Court has explained, equity 
long ago rejected the "ancient common law" rule that things in action were not assignable 
because "the act of assignment was regarded against public policy, if not illegal." Casady v. 
Scott, 40 Idaho 137,237 P. 415, 421 (1924). Instead, "equity has always held that the 
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assignment of a thing in action, for a valuable consideration, should be enforced, and has given 
effect to assignments of every kind of future and contingent interests or possibilities in real or 
personal property when made upon a valuable consideration." Id. 
Applying this general rule, Idaho courts have explicitly recognized that a client may 
acquire assignable rights against a law firm. In Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 
657 P.2d 1102 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983), the client owed money to a creditor, Bonanza Motors, on a 
delinquent promissory note. To obtain forbearance against judgment on the note, the client gave 
the creditor a partial assignment of his interest in funds to be received from an action against an 
insurance company in which the law firm had represented him and obtained a favorable 
judgment. The assignment instrument directed the law firm to pay the creditor directly when the 
funds were received, but it failed to do so. The creditor sued on the assignment and obtained 
summary judgment against the law firm. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment 
in favor of the creditor, rejecting the law firm's claim that its obligation to the client did not give 
rise to an assignable right. The court viewed the assignment as embracing two elements: the 
client's underlying right to recover from the insurance company, and the client's right to 
disbursement of the proceeds by the law firm when proceeds of the action were received. Id. at 
1103. Regarding the first, the court recognized that it is settled in Idaho that a cause of action 
may be assigned. Regarding the second, "it appears to be well established that an attorney-client 
relationship generally imposes upon the law firm a contractual obligation, analogous to that of an 
agent or trustee, to account for funds received in the course of legal representation and to pay the 
client any sums to which he may be entitled." Id. at 1104. The court concluded that the law firm 
owed the client an obligation which gave rise to an assignable right. Id. 
While Bonanza Motors did not involve assignment of a legal malpractice claim, but 
rather of other contractual rights, it nevertheless makes clear that the general rule that things in 
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action may be assigned applies equally to claims against law firms. There is no principled basis 
for distinguishing that situation from the one presented here, where Luciani owed Magic Valley 
contractual duties which similarly gave rise to assignable rights. 
2. Under Idaho Law, Legal Malpractice Claims Survive The Death Of A 
Plaintiff, And Therefore Are Assignable. 
The rule that a legal malpractice claim may be assigned to a successor entity is also 
consistent with Idaho law regarding the survival of claims. Under the common law rule, claims 
based in contract survive the death of the plaintiff, while claims in tort do not. Legal malpractice 
actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories, and therefore survive a former client's 
death. Because survivability and assignability are closely related, it follows that legal 
malpractice claims may also be assigned. 
At common law, claims arising out of contracts (claims ex contractu) generally survive 
the death of the claimant, while those which sound in pure tort (claims ex delicto) abate. See 
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957,961 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 
184 P. 477,477 (1919). The question whether a claim survives is closely related to the question 
whether it is assignable. As the Court noted in MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254 
(1926), "[t]he assignability of a cause of action is by authorities intimately associated with, and 
in most cases held to depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action. Thus, 
if it survives, it may be assigned; if not, it may not." 249 P. at 257. 
In determining which causes of action survive the death of an owner, Idaho courts 
distinguish between injuries of a personal nature, which do not survive, and injury which lessens 
the estate of an injured party, which does survive, and is thus assignable. Id. In the former 
category are claims for injury to person, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, libel, slander 
and the like. Id. (holding that "an injury suffered through fraud, false representations, or deceit, 
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resulting in the diminution of the estate of the injured party, survives and is assignable"). 
Claims for legal malpractice are not personal injury claims, but rather claims arising out 
of contract which seek to recover for economic loss. As this Court has recognized, "[l]egal 
malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 
702, 704, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982). While a legal malpractice claim has a tort basis, the 
attorney's duty is contractual and the scope of that contractual duty is defined by the purposes for 
which the attorney is retained. Jd.; accord, Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 
248 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2011) ("A legal malpractice action is based on a combination of tort and 
contract theories. The attorney-client relationship is generally based on contract principles, 
while the negligence standard is based on tort principles"); cf Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 
322,256 P.3d 730, 734 (2011) (Court has "repeatedly observed that a contract for legal services 
can be a 'commercial transaction' as defined in" § 12-120(3)).6 
Moreover, compensable damages suffered by a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action are 
limited to the pecuniary loss attributable to the defendant's wrongful acts. O'Neil v. Vasseur, 
796 P.2d 134, 140 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); see also, e.g., Hedlund Mfg. Co., 539 A.2d at 359 ("By 
contrast [to a claim for damages for personal injury], a claim for damages based upon legal 
malpractice does not involve personal injury in that it arises out of negligence and breach of 
contract, and the injury alleged concerns purely pecuniary interests. The rights involved are 
more akin to property rights which can be assigned prior to liquidation"); Oppel v. Empire Mut. 
6 Indeed, it is not uncommon in legal malpractice cases for a plaintiff to bring both 
negligence and breach of contract claims. See, e.g., Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 
Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303, 305 (2000) (attorney malpractice, breach of contract, fraud and 
misrepresentation); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002) (professional 
negligence, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract). 
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Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (cause of action for legal malpractice is 
assignable "in that it is based both on breach of implied contract and negligence, and does not 
involve personal injuries") (footnote omitted). 
For these reasons, a cause of action for legal malpractice, which arises out of an attorney-
client contract, survives the death of the client. See Shelton v. Owens, No. CV -09-3597, 2010 
WL 3393364 (Idaho Dist. Ct. July 2010) (holding that cause of action against attorney for legal 
malpractice sounded in both tort and contract, and thus the action survived former client's death). 
It is therefore also assignable. There is no reason a different rule should apply where, as here, 
the claim is asserted by a corporate plaintiff that assigns its claims to a successor corporate 
entity.7 
Here, St. Luke's claims arise directly out of the attorney-client relationship that was 
formed when Farmers hired Luciani to represent Magic Valley in the underlying litigation 
(CompI. <J[<J[ 2, 7, 20, 52, 62), and St. Luke's is seeking to recover pecuniary losses proximately 
caused by Luciani's legal malpractice, including millions of dollars in payments it or its 
predecessor, Magic Valley, were forced to make to successor counsel and to an outside expert, 
Coding Compliance, to remedy that malpractice and protect the Hospital against ruinous liability. 
Because those claims are assignable "things in action," and arise out of contract, the majority 
rule permitting a predecessor entity to assign legal malpractice claims to its successor is 
consistent with Idaho law. 
7 Effective July 1,2011, Idaho Code § 5-327(2) came into effect, providing for general 
survivability of negligence claims: "A cause of action for personal injury or property damage 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured 
person from causes not related to the wrongful action or negligence." 
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C. The General Rule In Some Other States Against Assignment Of Legal 
Malpractice Claims Should Not Apply To Bar St. Luke's Claims. 
As the district court observed, courts in other jurisdictions are split on whether legal 
malpractice actions are assignable: some hold assignment to be against public policy, while 
other courts allow assignment under certain circumstances. Order at 1. It is true, as Luciani 
argued below, that the majority of jurisdictions to have considered the issue articulate a general 
rule of non-assignability. See generally Annot., Assignability of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 64 
A.L.R.6th 473 (2011); Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7:12, at 829-57. 8 However, nearly 
all of those cases involved purported assignments to strangers to the attorney-client relationship, 
often the client's litigation adversary, rather than to a successor in a commercial transaction, the 
context in which the issue is presented here. As a number of courts have pointed out, the public 
policy considerations invoked to support that rule do not apply in this context, and therefore do 
not mandate "blind adherence to a general rule of prohibition in all cases of assignment." 
Cerberus Partners, 728 A.2d at 1060. This Court therefore should reject the general rule of 
non-assignability in favor of the specific rule applicable in this context, which permits a 
predecessor entity to assign legal malpractice claims to a successor. 
The leading case that first articulated a rule against assignment of legal malpractice 
actions was Goodley v. Wank and Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Cal. App. 1976). In Goodley, 
the plaintiff was the assignee of a claim for legal malpractice against defendant attorneys arising 
out of their advice to the wife in a dissolution proceeding. The California Court of Appeal 
8 Approximately fifteen jurisdictions apply a general non-assignability rule, while at least 
nine allow assignment of legal malpractice claims, at least under certain circumstances: Illinois, 
New Mexico, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, District of Columbia, 
and Pennsylvania. 64 A.L.R.6th §§ 4, 5, 18. 
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affirmed summary judgment for the attorneys on the ground that a claim for legal malpractice is 
not assignable as a matter of public policy. The court acknowledged that by statute in California, 
choses in action arising out of an obligation or breach of contract are generally assignable, and 
that "the relationship between plaintiff's assignor and defendants arose out of a contract for legal 
services." 133 Cal. Rptr. at 84-86. However, it concluded that the legal malpractice claim 
nevertheless was not assignable, basing its holding on "the uniquely personal nature of legal 
services and the contract out of which a highly personal and confidential attorney-client 
relationship arises, and public policy considerations based thereon." !d. at 86. The court 
elaborated on those concerns as follows: 
The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice 
action to the market place and convert it to a commodity to be 
exploited and transferred to economic bidders who have never had 
a professional relationship with the attorney and to whom the 
attorney never owed a legal duty, and who have never had any 
prior connection with the assignor or his rights. The commercial 
aspect of assignability of choses in action arising out of legal 
malpractice is rife with probabilities that could only debase the 
legal profession. The almost certain end result of merchandizing 
such causes of action is the lucrative business of factoring 
malpractice claims which would encourage unjustified lawsuits 
against members of the legal profession, promote champerty and 
force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers. The 
endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such 
commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the 
legal profession but the already overburdened judicial system, 
restrict the availability of competent legal services, embarrass the 
attorney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the highly 
confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attorney 
and client. 
Ie!. at 87; see also, e.g., Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 183-84 (Or. App. 2001) (summarizing 
the concerns cited by those courts that hold that legal malpractice claims may never be assigned). 
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The Goodley mle of non-assignability has been the subject of considerable scholarly 
criticism,9 and has been rejected by a significant number of jurisdictions, including the high 
courts of Massachusetts and Maine. Cerberus Partners, L.P., 728 A.2d at 1060 ("both time and 
academic criticism have served to question [Goodley's] general blanket application to all manner 
of assignability of legal malpractice claims"); see, e.g., New Hampshire ins. Co., inc. v. McCann, 
707 N.E.2d 332,336 (Mass. 1999) ("We are not persuaded that every voluntary assignment of a 
legal malpractice claim should be barred as matter of law"); Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co., 
567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989) ("there is no reason to prohibit the assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim in a situation such as this"). This Court should decline to impose that general 
rule to bar St. Luke's claims against Luciani, for several reasons. 
1. This Court Should Not Substitute Its Views Of Public Policy For Those 
Of The Idaho Legislature. 
At the threshold, this Court should decline to substitute its own views for those of the 
Idaho Legislature, which has expressly directed by statute that things in action are assignable, 
without carving out any exceptions to that general rule. As this Court recently stated, 
9 See, e.g., Note, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A Contractual Solution 
to a Contractual Problem, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 481, 483 (2003) (arguing that the policy reasons 
given by courts that follow the blanket non-assignability rule are "unpersuasive" and that "legal 
malpractice claims should be freely assignable, as is almost every other chose in action"); Quinn, 
On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1205 (1996) (arguing 
that "the Goodley mle is not sustained by sound legal or public policy reasoning"); Comment, 
Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1533, 
1534-35, 1545 (1992) (concluding that "the interests of consistency and public policy favor 
permitting voluntary assignments of legal malpractice claims," and that "few of the arguments 
made against the assignment of legal malpractice claims stand up to close scmtiny"). 
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The legislati ve power is vested in the senate and house of 
representatives, not in this Court. As we said in Berry v. Koehler, 
84 Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010,1013 (1962), "The wisdom, 
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the 
legislature alone." 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, No. 37574-2010,2011 WL 5375192 (Idaho 
Nov. 9,2011), at *5 (citation omitted). For that reason, as the Hawaii Supreme Court recently 
observed in ruling that professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud claims are 
assignable, even if a court is "not unsympathetic" to the view that public policy should preclude 
such assignment, it should defer to the legislature: 
However, questions regarding the wisdom of permitting such 
assignments are more appropriately directed to the legislature, 
which is better positioned to balance the policy considerations and 
potential consequences that will flow from such a decision. 
TMJ Hawaii, Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d 444 (Haw. 2007);10 see also lkuno v. Yip, 912 
F.2d 306, 313 n.9, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The Washington legislature has not seen fit to limit 
the application of the execution statute. Nor shall we.") (reversing dismissal of legal negligence 
claim against attorney by non-client investor who bought aU of corporate client's assets at a 
sheriff's sale, including "all right, title, and interest of [company], ... in all rights, choses in 
action, and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever against any and all persons whomever, 
including but not limited to, claims against the following persons: ... [attorney]"). 
10 Although a law firm was one of the named defendants in TMJ Hawaii, the court did not 
address the specific question whether legal malpractice claims are assignable, which was not 
certified to that court. 153 P.3d at 446 n.1. The court's reasoning in that case, however, is 
equally applicable to legal malpractice claims. 
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2. Nearly All Cases Applying The Rule Of Non-Assignability Involve 
Assignments To Strangers, Not To Successors In Interest. 
The rule of non-assignability of legal malpractice claims should not apply where, as here, 
the assignment in question was to a successor entity in the context of a larger commercial 
transaction. The vast majority of reported cases that refuse to allow assignment involve 
situations where a party sought to assign legal malpractice claims against its attorneys to a 
stranger to the attorney-client relationship, such as the client's litigation adversary. Indeed, some 
courts have explicitly limited their holdings to that situation. See, e.g., Gurski v. Rosenblum and 
Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163, 165, 171 (Conn. 2005) (holding that "an assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim or the proceeds from such a claim to an adversary in the same litigation that 
gave rise to the alleged malpractice is against public policy and therefore unenforceable," but 
noting "we are not persuaded that every voluntary assignment of a legal malpractice action 
should be barred as a matter of law"); Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Wash. 
2003) (holding that a legal malpractice claim is not "assignable to an adversary in the same 
litigation that gave rise to the alleged legal malpractice," but "leaving for another day the broader 
issue of whether legal malpractice claims may be assignable in other circumstances"); see also, 
e.g., Eden Technologies, LLC v. Kile Goekjian Reed & McManus, PLLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 
(D.D.C. 2009) ("The issue in this case is not whether legal malpractice claims can be assigned, 
but rather, whether a company can assign its legal malpractice claim to a former litigation 
adversary as a part of the settlement of that litigation"). 
As the courts have recognized, a commercial transaction in which an entity voluntarily 
transfers assets and liabilities to a successor, including claims against third parties, involves 
entirely different issues. Highlighting the point, the Eden Technologies court found that the 
assignment of a malpractice claim to a litigation adversary would be invalidated as a matter of 
31 
public policy under District of Columbia law, but distinguished Richter on the ground that the 
malpractice claim there "was not bartered or sold to an unrelated third party and [the assignor] 
and [assignee] were never opponents in litigation during which the alleged malpractice occurred. 
It was merely a sale of a corporation's assets." 675 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (citation omitted); see also, 
e.g., Richter, 940 F. Supp. at 357 ("The courts that have barred the assignment of legal 
malpractice claims have relied primarily on factors not present in this case, including the fear 
that parties will sell off claims, particularly to opponents or completely unrelated third parties, 
and a concern about jeopardizing the personal nature of legal services") (citations omitted); 
Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 184 (Or. App. 2001) ("An assignment of a malpractice claim by 
one corporation to another as part of a merger or acquisition does not present these concerns"). 
The blanket rule therefore should not apply here. 
3. None Of The Public Policy Considerations Underlying The General 
Rule Applies Here. 
Most broadly, the public policy considerations that are said to justify a blanket rule of 
non-assignability simply do not apply here, and for that reason the rule itself should not apply. 
An examination of each of the factors said to justify the Goodley rule readily establishes that 
none applies here. This Court therefore should not adopt that rule to bar St. Luke's claims here. 
As the Oregon Court of Appeals recently put it in declining to adopt the rule, 
The contrary rule that defendant proposes would bar assignment of 
malpractice claims even when the assignee has a bona fide interest 
in the claim and when none of the evils that may flow from such an 
assignment is present. 
Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180, 184 (Or. App. 2001). 
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First, "[t]his case does not raise the specter of open trading of legal malpractice claims," 
or of the creation of a market for such claims. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 337; 
Thurston, 567 A.2d at 923 ("We are not here confronted with the establishment of a general 
market for such claims; this assignee has an intimate connection with the underlying lawsuit").11 
To the contrary, the record is undisputed that Magic Valley assigned its claims against third 
parties to St. Luke's in the context of a larger transaction in which it transferred substantially all 
of its assets and liabilities to a new owner, which continued to operate the same business, with 
the same facility, employees and licenses. "Thus, we are not dealing here with a situation where 
a legal malpractice claim was transferred to a person without any other rights or obligations 
being transferred along with it." Cerberus Partners, 728 A.2d at 1059. For the same reason, 
there is no risk of collusion between the assignor and assignee. 
Second, Magic Valley's assignment of its legal malpractice claims to St. Luke's does not 
pose any threat to the duties of loyalty or confidentiality owed by Luciani. St. Luke's is Magic 
Valley's successor, not a litigation adversary or unrelated third party. Accordingly, there is no 
risk, as there might be in a case where claims were assigned to a litigation opponent, that "a party 
could sue the adverse party's attorney, thereby threatening attorney-client confidentiality." 
Gregory, 26 P.3d at 183-84. Nor is there any risk that such a plain-vanilla assignment to a 
successor, rather than to a litigation adversary, will "demean public confidence in the legal 
II The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has noted its suspicion that "fear of 
'open trading' is based in part on outmoded concepts and protectionism," observing that "[tJhere 
is nothing to show that, in those jurisdictions that permit the voluntary assignment of a 
malpractice claim, there has been an increase in baseless lawsuits." New Hampshire Ins. Co., 
Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 337. 
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profession." New Hampshire Ins. Co., Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 337. 
Third, that the claims were assigned in the context of a larger commercial transaction that 
took place months after Magic Valley terminated its attorney-client relationship with Luciani 
likewise eliminates any risk that "assignments would increase the frequency with which legal 
malpractice claims are brought, thereby providing a disincentive to supplying legal services to 
those who need them." Gregory, 26 P.3d at 183. Nor is there any merit to the concern that "the 
increased possibility of assignability may deter attorneys from zealously representing their 
interests." Id. "It is farfetched to imagine that a lawyer will be discouraged from zealously 
representing a client out of fear that the client may later offer a malpractice action against the 
lawyer as a part of the resolution of another case." New Hampshire Ins. Co., Inc., 707 N.E.2d at 
336-37. Indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence that Magic Valley's assignment of its 
claims against Luciani had any effect on Luciani's representation, which was terminated prior to 
the St. Luke's Transaction. 
rule, 
In short, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated succinctly in rejecting the blanket 
[T]here is no reason to prohibit the assignment of a legal 
malpractice claim in a situation such as this. We are not here 
confronted with the establishment of a general market for such 
claims; this assignee has an intimate connection with the 
underlying lawsuit. Although some cases from other jurisdictions 
flatly prohibit the assignment of any legal malpractice claim, their 
reasoning is not persuasive. A legal malpractice claim is not for 
personal injury, but for economic harm. The argument that legal 
services are personal and involve confidential attorney-client 
relationships does not justify preventing a client like 3K from 
realizing the value of its malpractice claim in what may be the 
most efficient way possible, namely, its assignment to someone 
else with a clear interest in the claim who also has the time, energy 
and resources to bring the suit. 
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Thurston v. Continental Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922,923 (Me. 1989). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should answer the question certified to it by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Idaho as follows: 
On the undisputed facts here, which involve "an asset and liability transfer from Magic 
Valley to St. Luke's" that included an assignment of "all claims against third parties by the 
Hospital," Magic Valley's assignment to St. Luke's of its legal malpractice claims against 
Luciani was effective under Idaho law. 
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